4. In What Ways Do Logistics Command Ships Provide Services To A Fleet On Maneuvers?

Military machine supply and maintenance

Trucks of the Red Ball Express, organized to supply Centrolineal forces in France after interruption-out from the D-Day beaches, moving through a regulating point, 1944

Military logistics is the subject field of planning and conveying out the movement, supply, and maintenance of military forces. In its nigh comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with:^[1]

Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.
Send of personnel.
Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
Acquisition or furnishing of services.
Medical and wellness service support.

History [edit]

The word "logistics" is derived from the Greek describing word logistikos meaning "skilled in calculating". The first administrative apply of the discussion was in Roman and Byzantine times when at that place was a military administrative official with the title Logista. At that time, the discussion plain implied a skill involved in numerical computations.

Historically supplies for an ground forces were first acquired past foraging or looting, especially in the case of nutrient and fodder, although if traveling through a desolated region or staying in i identify for too long resources could quickly be exhausted. A second method was for the army to bring forth what was needed, whether by ships, pack animals, wagons or carried on the backs of the soldiers themselves. This allowed the army some measure of self-sufficiency, and up through to the 19th century virtually of the ammunition a soldier needed for an entire entrada could be carried on their person. However, this method led to an all-encompassing baggage train which could slow down the army'south advance and the development of faster-firing weapons soon outpaced an ground forces'south ability to supply itself. Starting with the Industrial Revolution new technological, technical and administrative advances led to a third method, that of maintaining supplies in a rear area and transporting them to the front. This led to a "logistical revolution" which began in the 20th century and drastically improved the capabilities of mod armies while making them highly dependent on this new system.^[2] ^[iii]

5th to 15th century [edit]

Depiction of soldiers pillaging a town, conveying away their boodle by the barrow-load, 14th century

The De re militari, written by Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus in the late 4th-century, is an authoritative text which Illuminates the logistics, strategies and tactics, also as the training regimen for soldiers at the end of the Roman Empire, some of which was maintained and modified throughout the medieval period. It became used widely as a military guide during the medieval flow and demonstrates the medieval inheritance and adaptation of the Roman armed services infrastructure.

One of the about pregnant changes in armed services organisation afterward the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century was the shift from a centrally organized army to a combination of military forces made upward of local troops. According to the De ordine palatii—composed in the late 9th century as a reflection of the organization of courts nether Louis Iii of France and Carloman II—local troops often worked within the household during peace time and were provided nutrient and drink from the loftier officials in the business firm. The magnates of the households drew upon their own resources for their men, and during Charlemagne'southward reign and the reign of the Ottonian dynasty in Germany, some heads of business firm built permanent storages and dwellings to firm men or supplies.^[iv]

While on campaign, soldiers through the medieval period (the 5th to 15th century in Europe) were responsible for supplying themselves, either through foraging, looting (more mutual during sieges), or purchases from markets along the campaign route. Even and so, military commanders often provided their troops with food and supplies, just this would exist provided in lieu of the soldiers' wages if they worked inside the male monarch's household, or soldiers would exist expected to pay for it from their wages if they did not work in the male monarch's household, either at cost or fifty-fifty with a profit.^[5]

Some early governments, such as the Carolingians in eighth century, required soldiers to supply their own nutrient for 3 months, but would feed soldiers thereafter for free if the campaign or siege was ongoing. Later, during the High german civil state of war in the early on 1070s, Saxon soldiers were required to bring supplies enough for the entire campaign.^[6]

Every bit for food transportation for soldiers and the beasts which accompanied the army on the campaigns, approximately two,500 kilograms of food supplies were needed for the soldiers, roughly 9,000 kilograms of food for horses, and 19,000 kilograms (about ane/two of which was grain) was needed for other beasts of brunt (donkeys and oxen, for case) per 24-hour interval.^[vii] Commanders could also bring forth herds of cattle to provide their men with fresh meat while traveling. A herd of roughly 1,000 cattle could feed fourteen,000 or so men for roughly 10 days.^[8]

Beasts of burden were used equally vehicular transport for the food and supplies, either past carrying the supplies direct on their backs—the boilerplate medieval horse and mule could conduct roughly 100 kilograms—or by pulling carts or wagons, depending on the weather conditions.^[ix] Commanders as well made use of water ship throughout the medieval period as information technology was often more efficient than ground transport. Prior to the crusading menstruation, mid-scale ocean vessels could carry several dozen tons of supplies. Cargo ships were as well used, and were virtually ordinarily of the Nordic-blazon, the Utrecht-type, or the proto-cog crafts. Similar to the proto-cogs, river boats resembling uncomplicated log-boats were too used, as the larger crafts could carry upwards to 15 metric tons of supply and animal cargo. These ships made transporting supplies, and ofttimes soldiers, much easier and more than reliable for the commander; but, the ability to apply water send was express past geographic location, weather, and the availability of such ships.^[10] In the eastern Mediterranean, many vessels were smaller than those used in antiquity, often non exceeding 30-40 tonnes of cargo capacity. Supply by sea is non necessarily that much easier than supply by land, as factors like loading and unloading, stowage, and moving supplies to an army that may non be on the declension are all complicating factors.^[11]

Outside of nutrient and fodder, commanders and soldiers also carried with them their artillery and armor. In a letter from Charlemagne to Abbot Fulrad, the king states that horsemen must come up prepared with their own artillery and gear: including, "a shield, lance, sword, dagger, bow, and quivers with arrows".^[12] Likewise, according the Visigoth legal code (c.680), soldiers were required to come equipped for entrada with armor and shields. This practice was mutual throughout the pre-crusading period. Soldiers could oft obtain the needed supplies from local craftsmen: smiths, carpenters, and leather workers oft supplied the local militia troops with cooking utensils, bows and arrows, and horse shoes and saddles.^[13] Archaeologists have also institute evidence of appurtenances production in excavations of royal houses, suggesting that the Roman infrastructure of central arms and equipment factories was inherited, fifty-fifty if such factories were more decentralized. Farther, all estates during Charlemagne's reign were required to have carpenters staffed to produce weapons and armor, according to the Capitulare de villis.^[fourteen]

The construction of big-calibration weapons systems, particularly those designed for siege warfare, was besides an important part of military logistics. In the pre-crusading period, Vikings and Saxons would often employ lever-action rock-throwing engineering science; but, the torsion-powered spear-throwing ballistae was also common, though it required much more technological expertise to build. The nigh difficult of the large-calibration weapons systems to construct was the siege belfry, which was meant to provide besieging soldiers with the ability to shoot at the level of their opponents in the belfry or permit them to roll up to the tower itself and climb over the wall, breaching the fortress. The first recorded construction of a siege tower is in 984 during King Lothair Four'south siege of Verdun. These siege engines were ofttimes synthetic on site, rather than being constructed before the campaign and transported with the soldiers. In the 11th century, Emperor Otto III ordered siege engines to be built just one time he had arrived at the fortress of Tivoli to begin his siege, and Emperor Henry Two did the aforementioned upon arriving at Troia. It is generally assumed that the materials for the siege engines were transported forth with the food, fodder, and arms and that specialized craftsmen from the military households travelled with the regular army to build the engines on site.^[15]

In 1294, the same yr John Two de Balliol of Scotland refused to support Edward I of England'southward planned invasion of France, Edward I implemented a organisation in Wales and Scotland where sheriffs would acquire foodstuffs, horses and carts from merchants with compulsory sales at prices fixed below typical market prices under the Crown's rights of prise and purveyance. These goods would then be transported to Purple Magazines in southern Scotland and along the Scottish border where English language conscripts under his control could purchase them. This continued during the Kickoff War of Scottish Independence which began in 1296, though the organisation was unpopular and was ended with Edward I's expiry in 1307.^[5]

Starting under the rule of Edward II in 1307 and ending under the rule of Edward Three in 1337, the English instead used a system where merchants would be asked to meet armies with supplies for the conscripts to purchase. This led to discontent every bit the merchants saw an opportunity to profiteer, forcing conscripts to pay well higher up normal marketplace prices for food.^[5]

As Edward Three went to state of war with France in the Hundred Years' War (starting in 1337), the English reintroduced the practise of foraging and raiding to meet their logistical needs. This practice lasted throughout the grade of war, extending through the residuum of Edward Iii's reign into the reign of Henry VI.^[5]

16th century [edit]

Starting in the belatedly sixteenth century, armies in Europe greatly increased in size, upwards of 100,000 or more in some cases. This increase in size came not just in the number of actual soldiers but also camp followers — anywhere from half to one and a half the size of the army itself — and the size of the baggage train — averaging one carriage for every fifteen men.^[16] Yet, very little state back up was provided to these massive armies, the vast bulk of which consisted of mercenaries. Across being paid for their service by the state (an act which bankrupted even the Castilian Empire on several occasions), these soldiers and their commanders were forced to provide everything for themselves. If permanently assigned to a boondocks or metropolis with a working market place, or traveling along a well-established military route, supplies could be easily bought locally with intendants overseeing the exchanges. In other cases an ground forces traveling in friendly territory could expect to exist followed by sutlers, whose supply stocks were pocket-sized and subject to price gouging, or a commissioner could exist sent ahead to a town to make arraignments, including quartering if necessary.^[17]

When operating in enemy territory an ground forces was forced to plunder the local countryside for supplies, a historical tradition meant to allow state of war to be conducted at the enemy'southward expense. Yet, with the increase in army sizes this reliance on plunder became a major problem, every bit many decisions regarding where an army could movement or fight were fabricated based not on strategic objectives but whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs. Sieges in particular were affected by this, both for any army attempting to lay siege to a location or coming to its relief. Unless a military commander was able to implement some sort of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated countryside could be finer immune to either operation.^[17]

Conversely, armies of this fourth dimension had little need to maintain lines of communication while on the move, except insofar every bit information technology was necessary to recruit more soldiers, and thus could not be cut off from non-real supply bases. Although this theoretically granted armies freedom of movement, the need for plunder prevented whatsoever sort of sustained, purposeful advance. Many armies were further restricted to following waterways due to the fact that what supplies they were forced to carry could be more easily transported by gunkhole. Arms in item was reliant of this method of travel, since fifty-fifty a pocket-sized number of cannons of the period required hundreds of horses to pull overland and traveled at half the speed of the rest of the army.^[18]

17th century [edit]

Painting of marauding soldiers, Vrancx, 1647, showing people and the mural being devastated by military machine campaigns

The first half of the seventeenth century saw the Thirty Years' State of war devastate big parts of Europe where waves of large invading armies repeatedly plundered the same locations for supplies.^[19]

Past the mid-seventeenth century, the French under Secretary of State for War Michel Le Tellier began a serial of military machine reforms to accost some of the issues which had plagued armies previously. Besides ensuring that soldiers were more regularly paid and combating the corruption and inefficiencies of private contractors, Le Tellier devised formulas to calculate the exact amount of supplies necessary for a given entrada, created standardized contracts for dealing with commercial suppliers, and formed a permanent vehicle-park manned past ground forces specialists whose task was to bear a few days' worth of supplies while accompanying the army during campaigns. With these arrangements there was a gradual increase in the use of magazines which could provide a more regular period of supply via convoys. While the concepts of magazines and convoys was not new at this time, prior to the increase in army sizes there had rarely been crusade to implement them.^[20]

Despite these changes, French armies still relied on plunder for a bulk of their needs while on the motility. Magazines were created for specific campaigns and any surplus was immediately sold for both monetary gain and to lessen the tax burden. The vehicles used to form convoys were contracted out from commercial interests or requisitioned from local stockpiles. In addition, given warfare of this era's focus on fortified towns and an inability to found front lines or exert a stabilizing control over large areas, these convoys often needed armies of their own to provide escort. The primary benefits of these reforms was to supply an army during a siege. This was borne out in the successful campaign of 1658 when the French army at no point was forced to end a siege on account of supplies, including the Siege of Dunkirk.^[20]

Le Tellier'due south son Louvois would continue his father's reforms after assuming his position. The well-nigh important of these was to guarantee gratis daily rations for the soldiers, amounting to two pounds of bread or hardtack a day. These rations were supplemented as circumstances allowed by a source of protein such as meat or beans; soldiers were still responsible for purchasing these items out-of-pocket just they were oft available at below-marketplace prices or even free at the expense of the state. He also made permanent a system of magazines which were overseen by local governors to ensure they were fully stocked. Some of these magazines were dedicated to providing frontier towns and fortresses several months' worth of supplies in the consequence of a siege, while the rest were defended to supporting French armies operating in the field.^[21]

With these reforms French armies enjoyed 1 of the best logistical systems in Europe, still there were still astringent restrictions on its capabilities. Just a fraction of an army's supply needs could be met past the magazines, requiring that it continue to use plunder. In particular this was true for perishable appurtenances or those too beefy to store and transport such every bit forage. The assistants and transportation of supplies remained inadequate and field of study to the deprivations of private contractors. The chief aim of this system was still to go on an ground forces supplied while conducting a siege, a chore for which it succeeded, rather than increase its freedom of motility.^[22]

18th century [edit]

The British were seriously handicapped in the American War of Independence by the demand to ship all supplies across the Atlantic, since the Americans prevented well-nigh local purchases. The British establish a solution afterward the war by creating the infrastructure and the experience needed to manage an empire. London reorganized the management of the supply of military food and send that was completed in 1793–94 when the naval Victualling and Ship Boards undertook those responsibilities. It congenital upon experience learned from the supply of the very-long-distance Falklands garrison (1767–72) to systematize needed shipments to distant places such every bit Commonwealth of australia, Nova Scotia, and Sierra Leone. This new infrastructure allowed Uk to launch large expeditions to the Continent during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and to develop a global network of garrisons in the colonies.^[23]

19th century [edit]

Napoleon [edit]

Military train of the French Imperial Guard

Before the Napoleonic wars, military supply was based on contracts with private companies, looting and requisition (legal taking of any the regular army needed, with minimal compensation). Napoleon fabricated logistical operations a major part of French strategy.^[24] During the Ulm Campaign in 1805, the French army of 200,000 men had no demand for fourth dimension-consuming efforts to scour the countryside for supplies and live off the state, as information technology was well provided for by France's High german allies.^[24] France's ally, the Electorate of Bavaria, turned the city of Augsburg into a gigantic supply center, allowing the Grande Armée, generously replenished with food, shoes and armament, to quickly invade Republic of austria subsequently the decisive French victory at Ulm.^[25] Napoleon left null to take a chance, requesting the Bavarians to prepare in advance a specified amount of food at certain cities such as Würzburg and Ulm, for which the French reimbursed them.^[26] When French demands proved excessive for the German principalities, the French ground forces used a system of vouchers to requisition supplies and go along the rapid French accelerate going.^[27] The agreements with French allies permitted the French to obtain huge quantities of supplies within a few days' observe.^[28] Napoleon built up a major supply mag at Passau, with barges transporting supplies down the Danube to Vienna to maintain the French ground forces prior to the Battle of Austerlitz in combat readiness.^[25] In 1807, Napoleon created the first military train regiments—units entirely dedicated to the supply and the transport of equipment.

The French organisation fared poorly in the face of guerrilla warfare past Spanish "guerillas" that targeted their supply lines during the Peninsular State of war, and the British blockade of French-occupied ports on the Iberian Peninsula. The demand to supply a besieged Barcelona made it impossible to control the province and ended French plans to comprise Catalonia into Napoleon's Empire.^[29]

The first theoretical analysis of this was by the Swiss writer, Antoine-Henri Jomini, who studied the Napoleonic wars. In 1838, he devised a theory of war based on the trinity of strategy, tactics, and logistics.

Railways [edit]

Railways and steamboats revolutionized logistics by the mid-19th century.

In the American Civil War (1861–65), both armies used railways extensively, for transport of personnel, supplies, horses and mules, and heavy field pieces. Both tried to disrupt the enemy's logistics by destroying trackage and bridges.^[30] Armed forces railways were built specifically for supporting armies in the field.

During the Vii Weeks War of 1866, railways enabled the swift mobilization of the Prussian Army, but the problem of moving supplies from the end of rail lines to units at the front resulted in nearly 18,000 tons trapped on trains unable to be unloaded to ground transport.^[31] The Prussian use of railways during the Franco-Prussian War is often cited as a prime example of logistic modernizations, but the advantages of maneuver were often gained by abandoning supply lines that became hopelessly congested with rear-area traffic.^[32]

20th century [edit]

World War I [edit]

German horse-drawn supply bottleneck in front of conditional bridges about Étricourt, France, during Operation Michael, 24 March 1918

With the expansion of military conscription and reserve systems in the decades leading up to the 20th century, the potential size of armies increased substantially, while the industrialization of firepower (bolt-activeness rifles with college charge per unit-of-fire, larger and more arms, plus motorcar guns) was starting to multiply the potential amount munitions each required. Military logistical systems, however, connected to rely on 19th century technology.

When World War I started, the capabilities of track and horse-drawn supply were stretched to their limits. Where the stalemate of trench warfare took hold, special narrow gauge trench railways were built to extend the rail network to the front lines. The great size of the German Army proved too much for its railways to back up except while immobile.^[33] Tactical successes like Operation Michael devolved into operational failures where logistics failed to go on up with the army'southward advance over crush-torn ground.^[34]

On the seas, the British blockade of Deutschland kept a stranglehold on raw materials, goods, and food needed to support Frg'due south state of war efforts, and is considered one of the cardinal elements in the eventual Allied victory in the war.^[35] At the same time, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare showed the vulnerability of shipping lanes despite Allied naval superiority.

World War 2 [edit]

Allied cargo ship convoy crosses the Atlantic, c. 1944

The mechanization of warfare, starting at the tail terminate of World State of war I, added increasing ammo, fuel, and maintenance needs of tanks and other combat vehicles to the burden on military logistics. The growing needs of more powerful and numerous military ships and aircraft increased this burden fifty-fifty further. On the other hand, mechanization also brought trucks to logistics; though they generally require better roads and bridges, trucks are much faster and far more efficient than fodder-bound equus caballus-drawn transport. While many nations, including Federal republic of germany, continued to rely on wagons to some extent,^[36] the US and UK readily switched to trucks wherever possible.

Military logistics played a significant role in many Globe War II operations, specially ones far from industrial centers, from the Finnish Lapland to the Burma Campaign, limiting the size and motion of whatsoever military forces. In the North African Campaign, with a lack of runway, few roads, and hot-dry climate, attacks and advances were timed as much by logistics as enemy actions. Poor logistics, in the form of Russia's vast distances and its state of road and rail networks, contributed to the fate of Deutschland's invasion of the USSR: despite many battlefield victories, the entrada lost momentum earlier the gates of Moscow.

Breaking the logistics supply line became a major target for airpower; a single fighter aircraft could set on dozens of supply vehicles at a time past strafing downward a road, many miles behind the front end line. Air superiority became critical for almost any major offensive in good weather. Centrolineal air forces took out German-controlled bridges and rail infrastructure throughout northern France to assist ensure the success of the Normandy landings, but after the breakout from Normandy, this at present limited the Allies' own logistics. In response, the Cherry Brawl Express was organized—a massive truck convoy system to supply the advance towards Germany. During the Battle of Stalingrad, supplying by air, called an airbridge, was attempted by Germany to go along its surrounded 6th Army supplied, only they lacked sufficient air transport. Allied airbridges were more successful; in the Burma Campaign, and in "The Hump" to resupply the Chinese war endeavour. (A few years later the war, the Berlin Air Lift was successful in supplying the whole non-Soviet one-half of the city.)

At sea, the Battle of the Atlantic began in the offset days of the war and continued to the terminate. High german surface raiders and U-boats targeted vital Centrolineal cargo ship convoys supplying British, American, and Russian forces, and became more effective than in Earth State of war I. Technological improvements in both U-boats and anti-submarine warfare raced to out-practise each other for years, with the Allies eventually keeping losses to U-boats in check.

Logistics was a major challenge for the American state of war effort, since wartime material had to be supplied across either the Atlantic or the even wider Pacific Ocean. Germany undertook an aggressive U-boat campaign against American logistics on the Atlantic, but the Japanese neglected to attack aircraft in the Pacific, using their submarines to fight aslope the surface Navy in large-scale battles.^[37] ^[38] ^[39]

Long logistical distances dominated the Pacific War. For the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese required numerous oiler ships to refuel the attacking armada at sea on-route. Massive numbers of transports, including thousands of US Liberty ships, were required to sustain the Centrolineal forces fighting back towards the Japanese homeland. Equally in the Atlantic, submarine warfare deemed for more losses than naval battles, with over 1,200 merchant ships sank.^[forty]

Gulf War [edit]

During Operation Desert Tempest, U.s.a. forces faced the daunting task of keeping over 500,000 American armed services personnel supplied in a geographically remote harsh surroundings with no pre-existing presence or basing arraignment.^[41] This challenge was only further underscored past the logistical needs of the forces involved. A typical The states armored segmentation was composed of 350 tanks, 200 Bradley fighting vehicles and 16,000 soldiers. Together their daily supply requirement could amount to 5,000 tons of ammunition, 555,000 gallons of fuel, 300,000 gallons of h2o, and fourscore,000 meals. To run into these needs the division was equipped with virtually a thousand trucks carrying cargo, fuel and ammunition, and iii,500 of the division'southward soldiers had logistical responsibilities. Despite these resources though, the division could only sustain itself for iii to five days before requiring resupply from an external source.^[42] Too, a typical squadron of 24 fighter aircraft would crave the equivalent of twenty C-141 Starlifters conveying supplies to back up its initial deployment and operational capability.^[43]

21st century [edit]

Afterwards 2016, as the counterinsurgency operations in CENTCOM were drawing downwards, the US Department of Defence force began to prepare for large scale combat operations (LSCO) against nearly-peer adversaries.^[44] These adversaries are expected to exist capable of integrated, coordinated, near-simultaneous operation in multiple domains (MDO) – air, space, land, sea, and cyber (that is, robotic, estimator-driven, even automated contest/crunch/conflict).^[44] The preparation of a Joint Warfighting Concept is expected.^[45] Four sub-concepts are: contested logistics,^[46] ^[47] ^[48] ^[49] artillery indirect fire, command and control (C2), and data reward.^[50] ^[51] ^[44] See Defender Pacific 2021, and Defender Europe 2021

In conditions approaching total state of war, top-downwards prosecution of a war may no longer be possible, as headquarters themselves become forepart-line units,^[51] which must remain on the move in gild to survive conflict.^[46] ^[52] "By 2035, sustainment nodes are to be survivable" and capable of quickly moving materiel to the fight.^[44] ^[45]

Mod developments [edit]

Logistics, occasionally referred to as "combat service support", must accost highly uncertain conditions. While perfect forecasts are rarely possible, forecast models can reduce uncertainty almost what supplies or services volition exist needed, where and when they volition be needed, or the best way to provide them.

Ultimately, responsible officials must make judgments on these matters, sometimes using intuition and scientifically weighing alternatives as the situation requires and permits. Their judgments must exist based non only upon professional knowledge of the numerous aspects of logistics itself but also upon an agreement of the coaction of closely related war machine considerations such as strategy, tactics, intelligence, grooming, personnel, and finance.

Nevertheless, case studies have shown that more quantitative, statistical analysis are often a pregnant improvement on homo judgment. One such recent example is the utilise of Practical Data Economics by the Office of Naval Research and the Marine Corps for forecasting bulk fuel requirements for the battlefield.^[53]

In major military conflicts, logistics matters are frequently crucial in deciding the overall outcome of wars. For example, tonnage war—the bulk sinking of cargo ships—was a crucial factor in World State of war Ii. The successful Allied anti-submarine campaign and the failure of the High german Navy to sink enough cargo in the Battle of the Atlantic allowed Britain to stay in the war and the ability to maintain a Mediterranean supply chain allowed the maintenance of the second front against the Nazis in North Africa; by dissimilarity, the successful U.South. submarine entrada against Japanese maritime aircraft across Asian waters effectively bedridden its economy and its war machine production capabilities and the Axis were unable to consistently maintain a supply chain to their North African forces with on average 25% fewer supplies than required beingness landed and disquisitional fuel shortages dictating strategic decisions. In a tactical scale, in the Battle of Ilomantsi, the Soviets had an overwhelming numerical superiority in guns and men, but managed to fire only x,000 shells against the Finnish 36,000 shells, eventually being forced to abandon their heavy equipment and abscond the battlefield, resulting in a Finnish victory. One reason for this was the successful Finnish harassment of Soviet supply lines.

More generally, protecting one's own supply lines and attacking those of an enemy is a fundamental military strategy; an example of this every bit a purely logistical campaign for the military ways of implementing strategic policy was the Berlin Airlift.

Military logistics has pioneered a number of techniques that have since become widely deployed in the commercial world. Operations research grew out of WWII military machine logistics efforts. As well, military logistics borrows from methods first introduced to the commercial world.

The Kargil Disharmonize in 1999 betwixt India and Pakistan also referred to as Operation Vijay (Victory in Hindi) is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain that posed significant logistical issues for the combating sides. The Stallion which forms the bulk of the Indian Ground forces'southward logistical vehicles proved its reliability and serviceability with 95% operational availability during the operation.

Loss of Strength Slope [edit]

Geographic distance is a central factor in military diplomacy. The shorter the distance, the greater the ease with which force can be brought to bear on an opponent. This is considering it is easier to undertake the supply of logistics to a force on the ground too as engage in bombardment. The importance of distance is demonstrated by the Loss of Forcefulness Gradient devised by Kenneth Boulding. This shows the advantage of supply that is forrard based.^[54]

U.S. Armed Forces classes of supply [edit]

The United States Military logistics support is grouped into x classes of supply:^[55]

Class	Description	Consumer Class
Class I	Subsistence (food), gratuitous (free) wellness and comfort items.	Troops
Class II	Habiliment, individual equipment, tent-historic period, organizational tool sets and kits, manus tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.	Troops
Class III	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (Politico) (package and majority): Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal.	Equipment
Class IV	Construction materials, including installed equipment and all fortification and barrier materials.	Troops
Class V	Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated items.	Equipment
Form Six	Personal demand items (such as health and hygiene products, soaps and toothpaste, writing material, snack nutrient, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, booze, and cameras—nonmilitary sales items) and paperclips.	Troops
Course Seven	Major terminate items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.	Equipment
Grade 8	Medical fabric (equipment and consumables) including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment. (Course VIIIa – Medical consumable supplies not including blood & blood products; Grade VIIIb – Blood & blood components (whole blood, platelets, plasma, packed ruby-red cells, etc.).	Troops
Course IX	Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies, and sub-assemblies (repairable or non-repairable) required for maintenance support of all equipment.	Equipment
Class X	Material to support nonmilitary programs such as agronomics and economic evolution (non included in Classes I through IX).	Civilians
Miscellaneous	Water, salvage, and captured material.	Troops

Supply concatenation management in armed forces logistics ofttimes deals with a number of variables in predicting toll, deterioration, consumption, and time to come demand. The United states Armed forces'south chiselled supply nomenclature was developed in such a manner that categories of supply with like consumption variables are grouped together for planning purposes. For example peacetime consumption of ammunition and fuel will be considerably less than wartime consumption of these items, whereas other classes of supply such as subsistence and article of clothing have a relatively consistent consumption rate regardless of war or peace. Troops will always require uniforms and food. More troops will require proportionally more uniforms and food.

In the table in a higher place, each form of supply has a consumer. Some classes of supply take a linear need relationship—equally more troops are added more supply items are needed—as more equipment is used more than fuel and ammo is consumed. Other classes of supply must consider a 3rd variable besides usage and quantity: time. As equipment ages more and more repair parts are needed over time, even when usage and quantity stays consequent. Past recording and analyzing these trends over fourth dimension and applying to time to come scenarios, the United states military can accurately supply troops with the items necessary at the precise moment they are needed.^[56] History has shown that good logistical planning creates a lean and efficient fighting force. Lack thereof can lead to a clunky, wearisome, and ill-equipped force with too much or also niggling supply.

See likewise [edit]

[edit]

Aerial refueling
Airlift
Regular army engineering maintenance
Expeditionary free energy economic science
Expeditionary maneuver warfare
Integrated logistics support
Line of communication or communications (LOC)
Logistician (see): Logistics Officer
Maréchal-des-logis
Materiel
War machine Technology
Armed forces supply concatenation management
NATO Stock Number
Performance-based logistics
Praefectus castrorum
Principles of sustainment
Seabasing
Sealift
Train (military machine)
Tooth-to-tail ratio
Underway replenishment

Specific logistics operations [edit]

Battle of Pusan Perimeter logistics
British logistics in the Falklands War
British logistics in the Second Boer War

References [edit]

Notes

^ AAP-half dozen 2009, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
^ Kress, pp. x–11
^ For a concise global history see Earl J. Hess, Civil War Logistics: A Report of War machine Transportation (2017) ch ane
^ Bachrach, Bernard S.; Bachrach, David S. (2017). "Military Logistics: Food and Fodder in Peace Time". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Abels, Richard. "War in the Middle Ages: Medieval Logistics – English language Experience". United States Naval Academy. Archived from the original on 13 Apr 2016. Retrieved iii Oct 2017.
^ Bachrach, Bernard South.; Bachrach, David S. (2017). "Military Logistics: Supplies Carried by Militia Troops". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ Bachrach, David S.; Bachrach, David S. (2017). "The Material Reality of Logistics". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ Bachrach, Bernard Southward.; Bachrach, David Southward. (2017). "Military Logistics: Conveying Food Supplies". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ Bachrach, Bernard South.; Bachrach, David S. (2017). "Armed services Logistics: The Textile Reality of Logistics". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ Bachrach, Bernard Southward.; Bachrach, David South. (2017). "Military Logistics: Water Transport". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ McMahon, Lucas (2021). "Logistical modelling of a sea-borne expedition in the Mediterranean: the case of the Byzantine invasion of Crete in AD 960". Mediterranean Historical Review. 36 (1): 63–94. doi:10.1080/09518967.2021.1900171. S2CID 235676141.
^ Halsall, Paul. "Medieval Sourcebook: Charlemagne: Summons to Army c.804-eleven". sourcebooks.fordham.edu . Retrieved 2020-xi-12 .
^ Bachrach, Bernard S.; Bachrach, David Southward. (2017). "Military Logistics: Arms and Equipment". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ "Carolingian Polyptyques: Capitulare de Villis". University of Leicester . Retrieved 2020-11-12 .
^ Bachrach, Bernard S.; Bachrach, David S. (2017). "Military Logistics: Big-Calibration Weapons Systems". Warfare in Medieval Europe c.400-c.1453. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN9781138887664.
^ Creveld, pp. 5–7
^ ^a ^b Creveld, pp. 8–10
^ Creveld, pp. ten–12
^ Wilson, Peter H. (2009). Europe'south tragedy : a history of the Thirty Years War. London: Allen Lane. p. 345. ISBN978-0-7139-9592-three.
^ ^a ^b Creveld, pp. 17–20
^ Creveld, pp. 21–22
^ Creveld, pp. 23–26
^ Morriss, Roger. "Colonization, Conquest, and the Supply of Nutrient and Ship: The Reorganization of Logistics Direction, 1780–1795," War in History, (July 2007), 14#3 pp. 310–24,
^ ^a ^b Schneid 2005, p. 106.
^ ^a ^b Schneid 2005, p. 129.
^ Schneid 2005, p. 107.
^ Schneid 2005, p. 108.
^ Schneid 2005, p. 167.
^ Morgan, John. "State of war Feeding War? The Impact of Logistics on the Napoleonic Occupation of Catalonia", Journal of Military History, Jan 2009, 73#i pp. 83–116
^ Huston, James A. online The Sinews of War: Regular army Logistics, 1775–1953 U.S. Army, 1966
^ Creveld, p. 84
^ Creveld, pp. 92–108.
^ Creveld, pp. 138–41.
^ Zabecki, David T. (2009). The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Report of the Operational Level of State of war. London: Taylor & Francis. p. 56. ISBN978-0415558792.
^ Vincent, C. Paul (1985). The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Occludent of Federal republic of germany, 1915–1919. Athens (Ohio) and London: Ohio University Printing.
^ Schilling. "Weapons, Strategy, and War, The Organization of Armies". Columbia University Middle for Didactics and Learning . Retrieved 30 October 2017. For send, the [standard 1944 German Infantry] sectionalization had 615 motor vehicles and 1,450 horse-drawn vehicles.
^ Alan Gropman, ed. (1997). The big 'L' : American logistics in World War II. National Defense Academy Press. pp. 265–92. ISBN978-1428981355. , Detailed overview. online gratuitous
^ William Fifty. McGee and Sandra McGee, Pacific Limited: The Critical Role of Military Logistics in World War Ii (2009)
^ Richard M. Leighton and Robert Westward. Coakley, United States Ground forces in Earth State of war II: State of war Department, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943 (1955).
^ Blair, Clay Jr. (1976). Silent Victory. New York: Bantam. pp. 359–60, 551–52, 816. ISBN978-0553010503.
^ The Logistics of War. DIANE Publishing. 2000. p. 205. ISBN9781428993785.
^ The Logistics of State of war, p. 206-207
^ The Logistics of War, p. 212
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Master of Staff Paper #one (16 Mar 2021) Regular army Multi-Domain Transformation Unclassified version
^ ^a ^b Main of Staff paper #two (1 March 2021) The Ground forces in Military Competition
^ ^a ^b Frank Wolfe (vi Oct 2020) Joint Warfighting Concept Assumes 'Contested Logistics'
^ NYT news service (5 Mar 2022) As Russian federation pounds Ukraine, Nato countries rush in javelins and stingers
^ Haley Britzky (fifteen Mar 2022) Russian logistics are and then bad, its military machine is begging People's republic of china for MREs Meal, ready to eat (MRE) in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine date dorsum to 2015.
^ Ivan F Ingraham USMC, Retired (x Mar 2022) A Marine special ops commander explains why Russia's stalled advance in Ukraine is no surprise
^ Mark Pomerleau (25 May 2021) U.s. Army emphasizes 'information reward'
^ ^a ^b Scott McKean (14 Jul 2021) AFC Pamphlet 71-twenty-9 Army Futures Command Concept for Command and Control - Pursuing determination dominance AFCC-C2 14 Jul 2021 see FUTURES AND CONCEPTS CENTER resources
^ BRUCE HELD AND BRAD MARTIN (eight Jul 2021) AN AMERICAN Forcefulness Construction FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
^ Hubbard, Douglas. How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of Intangibles in Business, John Wiley & Sons, 2007
^ Boulding, Kenneth Eastward. Disharmonize and Defence: A General Theory, Harper & Bros., 1962, p.262
^ U.South. Army Field Manual 4-0 Combat Service Support
^ Joint Logistics Assay Tool)

Bibliography

Creveld, Martin van (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press. ISBN0-521-21730-X. online
Dupuy, R. Ernest; Trevor N. Dupuy (1970). The Encyclopedia of Military machine History (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row. ISBN0-06-011139-9.
Eccles, Henry E. (1959). Logistics in the National Defense. Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Company. ISBN0-313-22716-0.
Engels, Donald W. (1980). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Los Angeles: Academy of California Press.
Gropman, Alan, ed. (1997). The big 'L' : American logistics in World War II. National Defense force Academy Press. pp. 265–92. ISBN978-1428981355. , Detailed overview. online free
Kress, Moshe (2002). Operational Logistics: The Fine art and Scientific discipline of Sustaining Military Operations. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN1-4020-7084-5.
Leighton, Richard G. and Robert W. Coakley. United States Ground forces in World War II: War Section, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943 (1955), The highly detailed official history. online gratuitous
McMahon, Lucas (2021). "Logistical modelling of a body of water-borne trek in the Mediterranean: the case of the Byzantine invasion of Crete in AD 960". Mediterranean Historical Review. 36 (i): 63–94. doi:ten.1080/09518967.2021.1900171. S2CID 235676141.
McGee, William Fifty. and Sandra McGee. Pacific Express: The Critical Role of Military Logistics in Earth War Ii (2009)
Schneid, Frederick (2005). Napoleon's Conquest of Europe: The War of the 3rd Coalition . Westport: Praeger. ISBN0-275-98096-0.

External links [edit]

Media related to Military logistics at Wikimedia Commons